Cryptanalysis of ITRU by R., Hashim H. et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
09
25
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 M
ay
 20
20
Cryptanalysis of ITRU
H. R. Hashim, A. Molnr and Sz. Tengely
Institute of Mathematics, University of Debrecen
P. O. Box 400, 4002 Debrecen, Hungary
e-mail: hashim.hayder.raheem@science.unideb.hu
e-mail: alexandra980312@freemail.hu
e-mail: tengely@science.unideb.hu
Abstract
ITRU cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem and one of the known variants of
NTRU cryptosystem. Instead of working in a truncated polynomial ring, ITRU cryp-
tosystem is based on the ring of integers. The authors claimed that ITRU has better
features comparing to the classical NTRU, such as having a simple parameter selection
algorithm, invertibility, and successful message decryption, and better security. In this
paper, we present an attack technique against the ITRU cryptosystem, and it is mainly
based on a simple frequency analysis on the letters of ciphertexts.
1 Introduction
The study of cryptography has been interested to cryptologists for long time because the
necessity of transferring important information secretly, which established the existence of
many types of cryptosystems. It is well-known that there are two types of cryptography,
which are symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography ( or, public key cryptog-
raphy). In the symmetric cryptosystem, the same key being used in the encryption and
decryption procedures. However, in the asymmetric cryptosystem two different keys are
used; the public key that should be announced to everyone and the corresponding private
key has to be secret. In fact, many models of these cryptosystems have been established
by several cryptologists. Indeed, nowadays the most used cryptography is the public key
cryptography for its better efficiency and security comparing to the other type. The security
of many public key cryptosystems such as Rivest, Shamir and Adelman (RSA) cryptosystem
[32], McEliece cryptosystem [22], ElGamal cryptosystem [5], or elliptic curve cryptosystem
(ECC) [18] is based on different intractable mathematical problems. In practice, all of
these public key cryptosystems are far slower than symmetric cryptosystems such as Data
Encryption Standard (DES) cryptosystem [28] or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
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cryptosystem [29] in terms of space and computational complexity and for this reason they
are often simply used to solve the problem of sharing a secret key for use in a symmetric
cryptosystem (for more details, see [38], [33], and the references given there ).
Therefore, the main target for cryptologists is the discovery of a fast public key cryp-
tosystem based on different hard problems. In 1996, Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [11]
proposed a class of fast public key cryptosystems called NTRU (Nth Degree Truncated Poly-
nomial Ring) cryptosystem, which was published in 1998. This cryptosystem is considered
as a lattice-based public key cryptosystem, and it is the first asymmetric cryptosystem based
on the polynomial ring Z[X]
(XN−1)
. Indeed, it has very good features comparing to other public
key cryptosystems such as reasonably short, easily created keys, high speed, and low memory
requirements. Its encryption and decryption procedures rely on a mixing system presented
by polynomial algebra combined with a clustering principle based on elementary probability
theory. From its lattice-based structure, the security of the NTRU cryptosystem is based
on the hardness of solving the Closest Vector Problem (CVP), which is a computational
problem on lattices closely related to Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and considered to be
NP hard (non-deterministic polynomial-time hardness) (for more details, see [24] and the
references given there ).
In fact, the inventors [11] proved that the NTRU cryptosystem preforms much faster than
other public key cryptosystems. For instance, the encryption and decryption procedure of a
message block of length N takes O(N2) operations using the NTRU cryptosystem and this is
considerably faster than the O(N3) operations required by RSA cryptosystem. Further, the
key lengths of NTRU cryptosystem are O(N), which is very good comparing to the O(N2)
key lengths required by other fast public key cryptosystems presented in [10] and [22].
Furthermore, preliminary experimental results by Shen, Du, and Chen [35] showed that
the speed of the NTRU cryptosystem is much faster than that of the RSA cryptosystem in
which the key generation is more than 200 times faster, the encryption is almost 3 times
faster, and the decryption is about 30 times faster. These results show the applicable possi-
bility of NTRU cryptosystem in mobile Java systems.
For further enhancement of the security of the NTRU cryptosystem, researchers have
been proposing several variants of NTRU cryptosystem. Starting with a generalization of
NTRU cryptosystem proposed by Banks and Shparlinski [1] with non-invertible polynomials
on the same ring as NTRU. The main advantage of this variant is that it is more secure
against some of the known attacks on the original NTRU cryptosystem such as lattice at-
tack. On the other hand, it is less efficient than NTRU since the lengths of its public key and
the ciphertext are twice the ones in the classical NTRU cryptosystem. Another analogue
of NTRU cryptosystem was introduced by Gaborit, Ohler, and Sole´ [6] called CTRU cryp-
tosystem in which the ring Z in NTRU cryptosystem is replaced by the ring of polynomials
F2[T ]. A new variant of the NTRU cryptosystem was presented by Coglianese and Goi [3]
called MaTRU cryptosystem. However, it operates under the same general principles as the
NTRU cryptosystem, it works in a different ring with a different linear transformation in the
encryption and decryption procedures. As a result, MaTRU cryptosystem is more efficient
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and has a better security level comparing to NTRU cryptosystem. Kouzmenko [19] used
Gaussian integers instead of the ring Z in NTRU cryptosystem to propose a generalization
of NTRU cryptosystem. However, it is not as efficient as NTRU, this scheme is slightly
more secure against lattice attack than NTRU cryptosystem. By replacing the ring Z in
NTRU cryptosystem by the Eisenstein integers Z[ζ3], Nevins, KarimianPour, and Miri [26]
proposed another variant, which we they called it by ETRU cryptosystem, which presents a
more difficult lattice problem for lattice attacks, for the same level of decryption failure se-
curity. Malekian, Zakerolhosseini, and Mashatan [21] presented a new variant called QTRU
cryptosystem based on using the ring of quaternions instead of the ring Z in NTRU cryp-
tosystem. They showed that the structure of QTRU cryptosystem gives more resistant to
some lattice-based attacks comparing to the classical NTRU cryptosystem.
Other variants have been introduced by many authors such ILTRU cryptosystem, which
is a modification of ETRU cryptosystem, introduced by Karbasi and Atani [16]. The security
of this cryptosystem is based on the worst case hardness of the approximate both SVP and
CVP in ideal lattices.
Last but not least, we mention one of the known variants of NTRU cryptosystem called
ITRU cryptosystem, which was presented in 2017 by Gaithuru, Salleh, and Mohamad [7].
Instead of working in a truncated polynomial ring, ITRU cryptosystem is based on the
ring of integers. They showed that the ITRU cryptosystem has some interesting features
such as having a simple parameter selection algorithm, invertibility, and successful message
decryption. In fact, a description of a parameter selection algorithm and an implementation
of ITRU with an application were provided. As a result, they claimed that the ITRU
cryptosytem has a successful message decryption, which leads to more assurance of security
in comparison to NTRU cryptosystem. Other variants of NTRU cryptosystem can be found,
e.g. in [27], [39], [17], [30], [36], [2].
However, the inventors of NTRU cryptosystem ensured that it is extremely unlikely to
several potential attacks against the scheme to succeed ( particularly, the standard lattice-
based attack ) since the secret key was surrounded by acloud of exponentially many unrelated
lattice vectors. Later, in 2001 Coppersmith and Shamir [4] showed that the security of NTRU
cryptosystem is not necessarily based on the difficulty of reducing the NTRU lattice since
the lattice reduction can be one of the practical attacks against NTRU cryptosystem. In
fact, they presented a lattice-based attack, which can either find the original secret key k or
an alternative key k′ which can be used instead of k to obtain the plaintexts by decrypting
the corresponding ciphertexts with only slightly higher computational complexity. After
that, many types of lattice-based attacks on the NTRU cryptosystem and its variants have
been occurred. It is important to mention that all of these attacks have focused primarily
on the secret key recovery problem. For instance, Gentry [8] proposed lattice-based attacks
that are especially effective when N, in the polynomial ring that used in the classical NTRU
cryptosystem, is composite. He used low-dimensional lattices to find a folded version of the
private key, where this key has d coefficients where d dividing N. This folded private key is
used to recover a folding of the plaintext, or it helps to recover the original private key.
However, a chosen ciphertext attack is another type of attacks, which was already used
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in [9] or [14] against other public key cryptosystems. Here, the attacker constructs invalid
cipher messages. By knowing the plaintexts corresponding to his messages, she can get some
information about the private key or even recover it. Such an attack was used against the
NTRU cryptosystem by Jaulmes and Joux [13]. Similar attack to the later one was proposed
by Meskanen and Renvalla [23].
Another attack on NTRU cryptosystem hardware implementations, that employ scan
based Design-for-Test (DFT) techniques, was proposed by Kamal and Youssef [15], and they
called it a scan-based side channel attack. This attack determines the scan chain structure
of the polynomial multiplication circuits used in the decryption algorithm which allows the
cryptanalyst to efficiently retrieve the secret key.
More attack techniques against NTRU cryptosystem and its variants can be found, i.e.
[31], [25], [34], [12], [20], and the references given there.
In fact, most of the attacks against the NTRU cryptosystem especially the ones mentioned
above focus primarily on the secret key recovery problem. Therefore, in this paper we present
a new attack technique to break the ITRU cryptosystem proposed in [7]. Since the ITRU
cryptosystem is a substitution cipher, so our attack is mainly based on a simple frequency
analysis on the letters of ciphertexts using a function implemented in SageMath [37] as
frequency distribution(). As a result, this techniques will recover the corresponding
plaintexts immediately with no need of having the private keys.
2 The ITRU Cryptosystem
As mentioned earlier, instead of working in a truncated polynomial ring ITRU cryptosystem
is based on the ring of integers. The parameters and the main steps of ITRU cryptosystem
are as follows.
◻ The value of p is suggested to be 1000.
◻ Random integers f, g and r are chosen such that f is invertible modulo p.
◻ A prime q is fixed satisfying q > p ⋅ r ⋅ g + f ⋅m, where m is the representation of the
message in decimal form. The suggested conversion is based on ASCII conversion
tables, that is the one with a→ 97.
◻ One computes Fp ≡ f−1 (mod p) and Fq ≡ f−1 (mod q). These computations can be
done by using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
◻ The public key is consisted of h and q such that
h ≡ p ⋅ Fq ⋅ g (mod q). (1)
◻ The encryption procedure is similar to the one applied in NTRU cryptosystem [11],
one generated a random integer r and computes
e ≡ r ⋅ h +m (mod q). (2)
4
◻ To get the plaintext from the ciphertext one determines
a ≡ f ⋅ e (mod q). (3)
◻ Recovering the message is done by computing
Fp ⋅ a (mod p). (4)
In order to show this later recovery leads to the original plaintext at the end, one can show
that as follows. Combining equation (3) with (2) and (1), with use of of the fact that f ⋅Fq ≡ 1
(mod q) we obtain that
a ≡ f ⋅ e ≡ f ⋅ (r ⋅ h +m) ≡ f ⋅ (r ⋅ p ⋅ Fq ⋅ g +m) ≡ r ⋅ p ⋅ g + f ⋅m (mod q). (5)
It remains to compute Fp ⋅ a (mod p) by substituting (5) in (4) and using the fact that
f ⋅ Fp ≡ 1 (mod p). We obtain that
Fp ⋅ a ≡ Fp ⋅ (r ⋅ p ⋅ g + f ⋅m) ≡ Fp ⋅ f ⋅m ≡m (mod p).
3 ITRU Cryptosystem Implementation
We note that to fix q one needs a bound for the largest possible value of the representation,
so here if one only uses the letters from ’A’ to ’Z’ and ’a’ to ’z’, then the maximum is 122.
In the following SageMath implementation we will use 255. Moreover, we preform our im-
plementation on the arbitrary message : Cryptanalysis.
ITRU Implementation Input
1 s =′Cryptanalysis′
2 pretty print(′The message is:′, s)
3 r = 8
4 p = 1000
5 F = Set([k for k in range(2,1000) if gcd(k,1000) == 1])
6 f = F. random element()
7 S =Set([2..1000])
8 g = S. random element()
9 m =[ord(k) for k in s]
10 pretty print(′ The ASCII code of the message :′, m)
11 q =next prime(p ∗ r ∗ g + 255 ∗ f)
12 Fp = (1/f)%p
13 Fq = (1/f)%q
14 h = (p ∗Fq ∗ g)%q
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15 pretty print(′ Large modulus :′, q)
16 pretty print(′ Public key :′, h)
17 pretty print(′ Private key pair :′, (f,Fp))
18 e = [((r ∗ h) +m[i])%q for i in [0..len(m) − 1]]
19 pretty print(′ The encrypted message :′, e)
20 a = [(f ∗ e[i])%q for i in [0..len(e) − 1]]
21 pretty print(html(r′$f\cdot e \pmod{q}$ is : $%s$
′
%latex(a)))
22 C = [(Fp ∗ a[l])%p for l in [0..len(a) − 1]]
23 pretty print(html(r′$F p \cdot a \pmod {q}$ is : $%s$
′
% latex(C)))
24 D =[chr(k) for k in C]
25 pretty print(′ The original message :′,′ ′.join(D))
Output
The message is : Cryptanalysis
The ASCII code of the message :[67,114,121,112,116,97,110,97,108,121,115,105,115]
Large modulus : 6186617
Public key : 180058
Private key pair :(73,137)
The encrypted message : [1440531,1440578,1440585,1440576,1440580,1440561,
1440574,1440561,1440572,1440585,1440579,1440569,1440579]
f ⋅ e (mod q) is :[6172891,6176322,6176833,6176176,6176468,6175081,6176030,
6175081,6175884,6176833,6176395,6175665,6176395]
Fp ⋅ a (mod p) is : [67,114,121,112,116,97,110,97,108,121,115,105,115]
The original message : Cryptanalysis
4 ITRU Plaintext Recovery
In this section we show how the ITRU cryptosystem can be attacked using a simple frequency
analysis on the letters of cipher message. This attack is preformed with SageMath Software
in which the plaintext is completely recovered only from the ciphertext and the public key
with no need to have the private key. However, this attack technique can be applied on
any encrypted message using the ITRU cryptosystem, let us preform this technique on the
following paragraph from the article describing ITRU cryptosystem [7] (without spaces):
′ThegoalofthisstudyistopresentavariantofNTRUwhichisbasedontheringof
integersasopposedtousingthepolynomialringwithintegercoefficients.We
showthatNTRUbasedontheringofintegers(ITRU),hasasimpleparameter
selectionalgorithm,invertibilityandsuccessfulmessagedecryption.We
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describeaparameterselectionalgorithmandalsoprovideanimplementation
ofITRUusinganexample.ITRUisshowntohavesuccessfulmessagedecryption,
whichprovidesmoreassuranceofsecurityincomparisontoNTRU.′
If this paragraph is encrypted with the large modulus q = 1104427 and the public key
h = 37619, then the ciphertext starts as
301036,301056,301053,301055,301063,301049,301060,301063,301054, ....
In fact, there are 32 different numbers appearing in the ciphertext these are between 300992
and 301073. A simple frequency analysis with the function frequency distribution() pro-
vides the following data:
[(301056,0.0380313199105145), (301057,0.0850111856823266),
(301060,0.0313199105145414), (301061,0.0290827740492170),
(301062,0.0648769574944072), (301063,0.0738255033557047),
(301064,0.0313199105145414), (301066,0.0536912751677852),
(301067,0.0850111856823266), (301068,0.0693512304250559),
(301069,0.0201342281879195), (301070,0.0111856823266219),
(301071,0.0111856823266219), (301072,0.00223713646532438),
(301073,0.0134228187919463), (300992,0.00223713646532438),
(300993,0.00223713646532438), (300996,0.00671140939597315),
(300998,0.00894854586129754), (301025,0.00671140939597315),
(301030,0.00671140939597315), (301034,0.0134228187919463),
(301036,0.0156599552572707), (301037,0.0134228187919463),
(301039,0.00447427293064877), (301049,0.0693512304250559),
(301050,0.00894854586129754), (301051,0.0357941834451902),
(301052,0.0246085011185682), (301053,0.109619686800895),
(301054,0.0223713646532438), (301055,0.0290827740492170)]
We see that the number 301053 appears the most in the ciphertext. Therefore, 301053
represents either e, a or t. If it is e, then we apply the formula
ci − 300952,
where ci represents the ciphertext blocks in the ASCII character code for all i. Thus, we get
a sequence of numbers starting with
84,104,101,103,111,97,108,111,102, ....
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Finally, if we consider it as a sequence of ASCII codes and determine the corresponding
plaintext, then we get the encoded message.
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